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1. Introduction   
Economic growth for the African continent averaged 5.8% per annum between 2001 and 
2008, significantly higher than the 2.3% average growth rate achieved during the 1990s. Key 
external factors that supported this improved growth performance have been strong capital 
inflows and rising commodity prices. Their beneficial impact on growth has been reinforced 
by the adoption of prudent macroeconomic policies, which promoted market-friendly 
initiatives after decades of heavy state intervention in many economies.  
Capital inflows have played an important role in financing investment and external deficits in 
many African countries. At the same time, higher commodity prices have helped improve 
external balances and growth outcomes in commodity-exporting countries. But large capital 
flows and volatile commodity prices have also led to greater macroeconomic volatility, real 
exchange rate appreciation, reduced external competitiveness and the build-up of balance 
sheet vulnerabilities in some countries.  
To inform a discussion of these issues, this note provides a broad outline of developments in 
capital flows and commodity price movements in Africa over the past decade. Section 2 
analyses trends in capital flows before, during and after the global financial crisis, and 
discusses briefly some effects of these developments on African economies. Section 3 looks 
at commodity prices and their macroeconomic effects in Africa. Section 4 discusses some 
policy challenges associated with foreign exchange market intervention in the context of 
volatile capital flows and commodity price movements. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Capital  flows 
Developing countries and Africa 
During 2001–07, net private capital inflows to developing countries increased fivefold, 
peaking at around $1.1 trillion in 2007 (Table 1).
2 As a ratio of GDP, net private capital 
inflows rose from around 4% in 2001 to just over 9% in 2007. The largest recipients at the 
regional level were East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe 
and Central Asia; together they accounted for 83% of all net private capital inflows to 
developing countries in 2007 (89% in 2001).  
There has also been a rapid increase in net private capital inflows to Africa: the inflows to 
sub-Saharan Africa amounted to $51 billion in 2007, four times higher than in 2001. While 
the share of sub-Saharan Africa in net capital inflows to developing countries remained fairly 
constant at around 5% during this period, the inflows increased as a share of the region’s 
GDP from 3% in 2001 to 7% in 2007. This compares quite favourably to most of the other 
developing country regions (Table 1).   
                                                  
1   The authors wish to thank Stephen Cecchetti, Serge Jeanneau, Philip Turner and Benedicte Vibe Christensen 
for comments, and Emir Emiray, Emese Kuruc and Agne Subelyte for research assistance. 
2   For recent analyses of developments in capital flows to emerging market economies (EMEs), see BIS (2008) 




After the outbreak of the financial crisis, net private capital inflows to developing countries 
declined by 53% between 2007 and 2009. There has also been a regional redistribution of 
inflows: all developing regions were able to increase their shares at the expense of Europe 
and Central Asia. In particular, the share of sub-Saharan Africa increased to 8% of all net 
inflows to developing countries in 2009, from 5% in 2007, the peak year of inflows (see also 
Chauvin and Geis (2011); and IMF (2010a) and (2010b)). 
Table 1 
Net private capital inflows by region 
In billions of US dollars  As a percentage  
of total flows 
As a 
percentage 
of GDP   
2001 2007 2008 2009 2001 2007 2009 2001  2007
Developing  countries  223  1,110  716 522 100 100 100  4  9 
  East Asia and Pacific  83  286  184  186  37  24  32  5  7 
  South Asia  8  113  53  68  4  10  13  1  8 
  Europe and Central Asia   29  413  251  58  13  40  15  3  15 
  Middle East and North Africa   5  28  23  26  2  2  5  1  3 
  Sub-Saharan Africa   11  51  34  36  5  5  8  3  7 
  Latin America and Caribbean  87  219  171  148  39  19  28  4  6 
Source: World Bank (2011).  
Regions within Africa 
For the 53 African nations for which the IMF’s World Economic Outlook data are available, 
net private capital inflows increased by a factor of 16 over the past decade, from $5 billion in 
2001 to $79 billion in 2010 (Appendix Table A1). The largest increase in net inflows was 
recorded in Africa’s emerging markets (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia), 
followed by frontier markets (Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) and financially 
developing countries (all the remaining ones). The emerging markets accounted for 54% of 
net private capital inflows to Africa in 2010 ($43 billion); the frontier markets for 20% 
($16 billion); and financially developing countries for 26% ($21 billion) (Appendix Table A1). 
In terms of GDP, the net inflows were the highest for Africa’s frontier markets (10.3%), 
followed by the emerging markets (4.9%) and financially developing countries (2.9%).  
 
Graph 1 
Net private capital inflows to Africa 














The breakdown of private capital inflows into balance of payments components – foreign 
direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and other investment – reveals some interesting 
cross-regional variation within Africa. Emerging markets experienced a strong increase in 
FDI from 2002 to 2008. However, over the past two years the crisis has led to the halving of 
FDI in these markets (Graph 2, left-hand panel). By contrast, portfolio inflows were 
surprisingly strong in 2010, exceeding FDI by some $5 billion. African emerging markets 
were also the largest recipients of net portfolio inflows before the crisis, especially in   
2006–07. But their reversal in 2008 was pronounced.  
 
Graph 2 
Net private capital inflows to Africa 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2010. 
 
Unlike Africa’s emerging markets, FDI inflows to the frontier markets and financially 
developing countries have been essentially undisturbed by the crisis (Graph 2, centre and 
right-hand panels). However, there have been very large net outflows of other investment in 
2006 (discussed below), and – together with portfolio investment – significant outflows during 
the crisis in 2007–09, especially from financially developing countries. In frontier markets 
other investment inflows recovered in 2009 and 2010 (Graph 2, centre panel).    
Composition of capital inflows 
Private capital inflows to Africa have been dominated by foreign direct investment, which 
accounted for two thirds of all net inflows in 2010 (Graph 1). FDI was rising almost without 
interruption from 2001 until 2008, when it peaked at around $66 billion. It was remarkably 
resilient during the crisis, averaging around $50 billion per annum in 2009 and 2010, about 
3% of Africa’s GDP. The steady growth of FDI in Africa is not surprising considering that the 
return on such investment is among the highest globally (UNCTAD (2008)). Much of FDI has 
taken place in natural resource-intensive sectors as a result of the strong rise in prices of 
metals, crude oil and natural gas. The major recipients have been Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia (Graph 3, left-hand panel).  
More recently, Africa has also strengthened its investment ties with developing countries as a 
result of growing South-South FDI flows. In particular, there has been a strengthening of 
investment relations between Asia and Africa (Graph 3, right-hand panel). Most of these 
investments involve Asia’s state-owned enterprises such as CNOOC (China), Petronas 
(Malaysia) and ONGC (India). China’s FDI stock in Africa amounted to around $8 billion in 
2008, of which 40% was in South Africa (UNCTAD (2010)). In recent years, Chinese private 
investors have also increased their presence in many African countries (Gu (2009)). About 
9% of India’s total outward FDI is destined for the African continent, with Ivory Coast, 




increased over time. For example, the share of African countries in South Africa’s FDI stock 
increased from 5% in 2000 to 22% in 2008. According to UNCTAD (2010), there were a total 
of 2,250 South African projects in African countries in 2009, in areas such as infrastructure, 
telecommunications, energy and mining. 
Graph 3 
Foreign direct investment in Africa 
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1  In millions of US dollars, 2006–08. 
Sources: OECD (2010); UNCTAD (2010). 
 
In terms of the sectoral composition of African FDI, particularly significant has been 
infrastructure investment, which plays an important role in expanding productive capacity, 
stimulating aggregate demand and improving resource allocation (McKinley (2009)). 
Infrastructure development has posed a serious constraint to Africa’s economic growth in the 
past. However, FDI by emerging Asian economies has started to stimulate infrastructure 
investment on the African continent in recent years. For instance, the World Bank estimates 
the total value of various multi-year infrastructure related financing agreements signed in 
2010 between China and Korea on one side, and Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ghana and Nigeria on the other, at over $22 billion (Appendix Table A2).  
Despite these developments, the narrowing of Africa’s infrastructure gap, especially in power 
and transport, is estimated to require investments of over $30 billion per annum for the 
foreseeable future (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010)). There is little doubt that both 
public and foreign investment are vital to address the infrastructure constraints in many 
African countries. One should note in this regard that foreign infrastructure investment does 
not crowd out domestic private investment if it is accompanied by capital inflows. Nor should 
it stretch domestic resources too far and put pressure on domestic prices – in the case of 
China’s infrastructure investment in Africa, for instance, there is usually a large import 
content of material, services and labour, so any inflationary impact of such investment would 
tend to be small. 
Net portfolio capital inflows were also rising before the crisis, especially to Africa’s emerging 
markets (Graphs 1 and 2). In the past three years, however, portfolio flows on the continent 
became very volatile. In 2008, when the crisis struck, some $30 billion in portfolio capital flowed 
out of Africa. There were also small net outflows in 2009. But in 2010 portfolio capital flows 
recovered strongly, with some $25 billion returning to the continent (Graph 1). The returning 
inflows benefited almost entirely Africa’s emerging markets (Graph 2, left-hand panel). 
A more detailed breakdown for a subset of these flows – into dedicated funds for individual 
African countries and developing country funds for which country or regional decomposition 
is available – shows that South Africa has been by far the largest destination for portfolio 
capital in Africa (Graph 4, upper left-hand panel). Portfolio capital flows to South Africa were 
quite volatile already before the crisis in 2008. They rebounded very quickly in 2009 and 




2011 there were net outflows from South Africa’s equity funds, though flows into its bond 
funds remained relatively large. 
For other African emerging markets, the pattern of portfolio flows was very similar to that of 
South Africa; one can notice especially the strong reflows into equity and bond funds in 2010, 
and the subsequent abrupt stop of inflows in the first quarter of 2011 (Graph 4, upper right-
hand panel). The same pattern was repeated – albeit with more volatility – for Africa’s frontier 
markets (lower left-hand panel) and financially developing countries (lower right-hand panel). 
Notice in particular the large outflows from the bond funds in these markets after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in the fourth quarter of 2008. Portfolio flows to financially developing 
countries were characterised by a much higher proportion of inflows to bond funds than in 
other regions and South Africa, where the equity inflows dominated. In 2011, after a strong 
start in January, virtually all African markets experienced net outflows from equity and bond 
funds in February and March. 
Graph 4 
Net portfolio capital flows into African equity and bond funds
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1  Quarterly sums of weekly data up to 30 March 2011. Data cover net portfolio flows (adjusted for exchange rate 
changes) to dedicated funds for individual African countries and to developing country funds for which country or
at least regional decomposition is available.       
2    Algeria (bond funds only), Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia.    
3  Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania (equity funds only), Uganda (equity
funds only) and Zambia.    
4  Bond funds: Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Libya; equity 
funds: Ivory Coast, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
Source: EPFR. 
Country decomposition based on the balance of payments data indicates that, in addition to 
South Africa, which received net portfolio inflows of $4.6 billion per year on average, Nigeria 
accounted for the bulk of portfolio inflows during 2000–09 ($0.7 billion per year; 
Appendix Table A3). More recently, some of the other countries, including Ghana, Kenya, 




several countries, in particular Egypt, experienced net outflows of portfolio capital during 
2000–09. 
Other investment flows, which mostly comprise cross-border bank lending to African 
countries and deposits placed by African countries in foreign banks, were negative but fairly 
stable from 2001 to 2005 (Graph 1). In 2006, the outflows jumped to almost $75 billion 
(Graph 2), due to large placements of deposits by some oil-exporting countries (in particular 
Nigeria) in overseas banks. Since 2008, the pattern of these flows has reversed. As the crisis 
began and foreign investors withdrew from Africa and other emerging markets, many African 
countries withdrew their deposits from overseas banks to compensate for the loss of liquidity 
in local markets. This resulted in net inflows of other investment of about $10 billion per year. 
To obtain better insight into trends in other investment flows, it is useful to look at the BIS 
locational banking statistics, which provide detailed information on external positions (claims 
and liabilities) of BIS reporting banks (mostly large international banks from advanced 
economies) vis-à-vis banks and the non-bank sector in Africa.
3 Claims of BIS reporting banks 
(which consist mainly of cross-border loans to African countries) vis-à-vis all sectors in Africa 
doubled between 2001 and 2010, with total amounts outstanding of close to $160 billion in 
the third quarter of 2010 (Table 2). The increase in cross-border lending was particularly 
pronounced for Africa’s frontier markets.  
Table 2 
External positions of BIS reporting banks  
Amounts outstanding, in millions of US dollars 
  2001 2007 2009  Q3  2010 
Claims on Africa      
Vis-à-vis all sectors  76,058  144,310  153,302  156,948 
   Emerging markets  39,669  76,201  72,334  73,732 
   Frontier markets  7,370  31,306  35,876  35,472 
   Financially developing economies  29,019  36,803  45,092  47,744 
Vis-à-vis banks  20,237  47,987  54,387  56,830 
   Emerging markets  16,137  33,280  35,528  36,336 
   Frontier markets  1,799  10,513  11,151  11,309 
   Financially developing economies  2,301  4,194  7,708  9,185 
Vis-à-vis non-banks  55,821  96,323  98,915  100,118 
   Emerging markets  23,532  42,921  36,806  37,396 
   Frontier markets  5,571  20,793  24,725  24,163 
   Financially developing economies  26,718  32,609  37,384  38,559 
Liabilities to Africa      
Vis-à-vis all sectors  108,945  358,019  278,595  285,618 
   Emerging markets  52,466  136,494  93,570  92,279 
   Frontier markets  21,862  90,089  67,002  69,327 
   Financially developing economies  34,617  131,436  118,023  124,012 
Source: BIS locational banking statistics.      
                                                  
3   For an analysis of the determinants of cross-border bank lending to the emerging markets using these data, 




Most of the increase in cross-border lending to Africa took place up to 2007. Since the start 
of the crisis, there has been a decrease in lending to Africa’s emerging markets; a moderate 
increase (around 13%) in lending to frontier markets; and a strong rebound (30%) in lending 
to financially developing countries (Table 2).  
About two thirds of cross-border loans in the third quarter of 2010 were vis-à-vis the non-
bank sector in Africa ($100 billion), and about one-third vis-à-vis African banks ($57 billion). 
One should note that the non-bank sector includes private non-financial and financial 
corporations as well as the public sector, including central banks. Relative to GDP, frontier 
markets had the largest share of total loans outstanding (30% of combined GDP of these 
markets, of which 20% to the non-bank sector).  
Unlike other developing regions of the world, African countries held in aggregate more 
deposits in the BIS reporting banks than they received loans from them. In the third quarter 
of 2010, for instance, total liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis all sectors in Africa 
amounted to $286 billion, ie $130 billion more than their assets vis-à-vis all sectors in Africa 
(Table 2). This imbalance reflects the underdevelopment of Africa’s financial systems in 
general and its banking systems in particular. More specifically, it implies that a large part of 
revenues from exports of African oil and commodities is not intermediated by local banks. 
Rather, it lies more or less idle – from the African perspective – in overseas banks, which 
recycle about 60% of these deposits as cross-border loans back to African banks and the 
non-bank sector. 
Finally, it is worth noting that official capital flows – bilateral aid to African countries and 
lending by international financial institutions – became much less significant in the past 
10 years compared to the previous decades. As shown in Graph 5, African countries were 
essentially repaying foreign official loans up to 2008. Particularly large repayments were 
made in 2006. Since the start of the crisis there has been some return of official capital flows 
to the continent, but the amounts involved ($6–8 billion per year) are small compared to 
private capital inflows.   
During 2004–08, African central banks also accumulated relatively large foreign currency 
reserves, on average around $25 billion per year (Graph 5). In 2009, the reserves fell as 
central banks in several countries provided foreign currency liquidity to the local markets to 
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Some consequences of capital inflows  
The effects of capital flows depend to a large extent on the structural characteristics of the 
recipient economy. Several features of African economies are worth noting in this respect.  
First, the level of financial market development strongly influences the composition and size 
of capital inflows and their impact on the domestic economy and financial systems. 
Developed and highly liquid financial markets help reduce the risks posed by volatile capital 
inflows. This has been the experience, for instance, of South Africa, which is receiving the 
bulk of portfolio inflows to Africa. The impact of volatile capital flows on financial markets and 
the real economy has been attenuated by South Africa’s flexible exchange rate and very 
efficient financial intermediation. Most other African countries have considerably less 
developed financial markets, so it is not surprising that capital inflows come to them mainly 
via foreign direct investment. FDI inflows, in turn, affect the recipient economy directly, 
through investment and increases in output, rather than indirectly through the financial 
system.  
Second, the degree of flexibility of product and labour markets has a large bearing on the 
macroeconomic impact of capital inflows. For instance, large capital inflows could result in 
asset price and wage pressures and sub-optimal output outcomes in the presence of 
rigidities such as insufficient supply of urban land for development or labour shortages due to 
restrictive labour legislation.  
Finally, exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies also condition the macroeconomic 
effects of capital inflows. Maintaining an exchange rate target requires the central bank to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to neutralise the effects of capital inflows or 
outflows on the exchange rate. Sterilising the impact of FX interventions has consequences 
for the balance sheets of domestic financial institutions and the central bank, which in turn 
affects the economy via credit growth.  
On the other hand, maintaining an inflation target and letting the exchange rate float freely 
weakens the link between capital inflows and domestic prices, but affects resource allocation 
by changing the relative price of tradables and non-tradables. Similarly, a procyclical fiscal 
policy exacerbates the expansionary effects of capital flows or the contractionary effects of 
outflows, while a countercyclical fiscal policy attenuates these effects. 
How do these considerations relate to the economic circumstances of Africa over the past 
decade? Regarding output effects of the composition of capital inflows, African countries 
have benefited from the fact that the bulk of inflows has been in the form of foreign direct 
investment. FDI has made a key contribution to the financing of fixed capital formation in 
Africa: between 2006 and 2008, FDI on average accounted for 32% of gross fixed capital 
formation, with much higher shares recorded in Angola (165%), Democratic Republic of 
Congo (60%), Guinea (95%) and Nigeria (100%).  
One should note that FDI statistics include mergers and acquisitions of firms already in 
existence, so increases in FDI may not necessarily imply higher productive capacity. 
However, most of the FDI in Africa has involved greenfield investments and hence increased 
productive capacity along with technology transfers and improved business processes. 
During the period of surge in capital inflows from 2003 to 2007, the investment rate in 
sub-Saharan Africa increased from 17% to 21% of GDP on average. Although this rate is 
much lower than the average for developing countries (28% of GDP), and the increase of 
4  percentage points over a four-year period is relatively modest, sub-Saharan Africa 
experienced the largest increase in potential output among developing country regions over 
this period (Table 3). About 80% of the increase was due to capital deepening and the 
remaining 20% to labour and total factor productivity growth. Similarly, in the Middle East and 
North Africa, two thirds of the increase in potential output was attributable to capital 
deepening.  





Change in potential output growth  
In percentage points 
  Change in potential  
output growth
1 
Change due to  
capital deepening 
Developing countries  1.5  0.6 
   Middle-income countries  1.5  0.6 
   Low-income countries  1.3  0.8 
East Asia and Pacific (excl China)   0.4  –0.1 
China 0.3  0.9 
South Asia  1.4  1.1 
Europe and Central Asia  0.8  0.6 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.3  0.1 
Middle East and North Africa  0.8  0.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.9  1.5 
1  Change in the growth rate of potential output, 2003–2007 versus 1995–2003. 
Source: World Bank (2010). 
 
FDI has taken place not only in the real sector of African economies but also in their financial 
sectors. Of note is that foreign banks account for almost 50% of financial intermediation in 
sub-Saharan Africa, measured by the share of foreign-owned banks in total banking system 
assets (Table 4). This share is the second highest among developing country regions 
(following Europe and Central Asia), and is considerably higher than 50% in many countries, 
given that the foreign bank presence in South Africa (which is financially the most developed 
country in the region) is relatively low.  
Reflecting the increased presence of foreign financial institutions, domestic bank credit to 
the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa expanded by almost 7% of GDP, and in the Middle 
East and North Africa by over 6% of GDP, between 2000 and 2007 (Table 4). This was 
higher than the average for other developing country regions. One should note, however, 
that the growth of private sector credit in Sub-Saharan Africa was underpinned by the strong 
expansion in South Africa (12% of GDP), where foreign-owned banks play a limited role.  
 
Table 4 
Foreign banks and domestic financial intermediation 
Private credit by banks,  
in % of GDP
1 
Share of assets owned 
by foreign banks (%)   
2000 2007  Change  2001  2005 
Developing countries   29.3  34.8  5.5  …  … 
East Asia and Pacific  66.1  55.4  –10.7  13.0  11.1 
Europe and Central Asia  16.8  32.5  15.6  42.0  54.4 
Latin America and Caribbean  24.9  27.1  2.2  30.4  35.6 
Middle East and North Africa 33.0  39.2  6.2  8.3 10.9 
South Asia  25.6  40.4  14.8  8.9  7.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  34.8  41.6  6.8  46.2  49.5 
1  Simple average. 




Another consequence of the greater presence of foreign financial institutions has been that 
cross-border bank flows increased considerably, both to the region’s banks and to the non-
bank sector (Table 2). The empirical literature has generally established a strong positive 
relationship between financial intermediation and growth (see eg Levine and Zervos (1998)). 
It has also been shown that the development of financial markets can facilitate efficiency 
gains in production (Nourzad (2002)) and poverty reduction (Beck et al (2007)). The recent 
African experience would seem to confirm these findings, especially the important role 
played by foreign investment in local financial institutions and domestic financial 
intermediation. 
Exchange rate pressures associated with inflows of “hot” money have generally not been a 
major risk factor for African countries. One exception is South Africa, which has experienced 
significant currency appreciation as a result of “hot” money inflows. The appreciation of the 
rand has adversely affected the South African manufacturing sector, which accounts for over 
15% of value added in the economy.  
The appreciation of the rand has also indirectly affected other currencies in southern Africa 
which form part of the Common Monetary Area (comprising South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia 
and Swaziland) and are effectively pegged to the rand, as it implies reduced international 
competitiveness and potentially reduced growth and employment for these countries. For 
countries whose currencies are not pegged to the rand, it implies better export prospects to 
the South African market. Similar effects apply to other African countries with currency pegs: 
for instance, fluctuations in the euro affect the external competitiveness of producers in the 
CFA member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo). 
3. Commodity  prices 
The surge in commodity prices has supported large FDI inflows to the extractive sector in 
many African countries. The implications of this surge for individual countries have 
depended, among other things, on whether they are net commodity exporters or importers.  
In the case of net commodity exporters, the effects of higher commodity prices have 
generally been expansionary. A positive terms-of-trade shock resulting from higher export 
commodity prices has stimulated economic growth, real income and employment. In the 
past, aggregate demand pressures resulting from terms-of-trade improvements have often 
resulted in inflationary pressures. However, the experience in the last few years has been 
more positive – most African countries have improved their inflation performance by not 
spending fully the windfall gains from commodity price booms. Greater expenditure restraint 
and the more consistent use of various commodity and sovereign wealth funds have 
contributed to these efforts.  
For net commodity importers, the effects of higher commodity prices have been similar to an 
increase in indirect taxes, ie they have reduced disposable income and domestic demand via 
income and substitution effects. Higher imported energy prices have also in some cases led 
to cost-push pressures, which have required particular attention by policymakers. 
Between 2002 and 2008, food prices doubled, metals prices nearly tripled, and energy prices 
almost quadrupled on the world commodity markets (Graph 6, left-hand panel). Since 
agricultural goods, minerals and crude oil make up almost 80% of African exports, the surge 
in commodity prices has had a significant positive impact on income and growth performance 
of many countries. For instance, the GDP growth rate for the group of commodity exporters 
in sub-Saharan Africa was on average 2¼ percentage points higher than that for the group of 
non-commodity exporters during 2003–08 (ie 7.6% vs 5.4%; Graph 6, right-hand panel). 





Commodity prices and GDP growth 




































Sources: IMF; World Bank; Bloomberg. 
 
The downturn in global demand following the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 resulted in sharp 
declines in commodity prices. Between mid-2008 and early 2009, the dollar prices of energy 
fell by over 35% and those of metals by 30%, while agricultural commodity prices remained 
more or less stable (Graph 6, left-hand panel). This was reflected in a significant decline in 
the average GDP growth rate of commodity exporters, from 7.6% before the crisis to 3.3% 
in 2009. The decline in growth reflected the lack of diversification in exports of many African 
commodity exporters, as well as the sharp contraction in the US and EU markets, which 
account for two thirds of African exports. However, the steady increase in commodity prices 
over the past year revived growth in commodity-exporting countries, to over 6% on average 
in 2010 – almost double the growth rate in 2009. One should note, however, that the non-
commodity exporters experienced even greater output variations. 
Large fluctuations in primary commodity prices relative to manufactured goods prices have 
led to significant shifts in the terms of trade for major commodity exporters and importers. 
These shifts have in turn affected trade balances and national incomes of both groups of 
countries. As shown in Graph 7, African countries relying on exports of primary commodities 
have experienced far greater trade shocks than the countries with more diversified export 
structures – shocks to export demand and the terms of trade for commodity exporters ranged 
from +9% of GDP in 2008 to –11% in 2009.
4 By contrast, countries exporting manufactured 
goods and those with diversified export structures have experienced considerably milder 
variations in trade.  
The terms-of-trade shifts have also had very large effects on government revenue. As 
shown in Appendix Table A4, government revenue in commodity- and oil-exporting countries 
fluctuated from 31–36% of GDP in 2007–08 to 24% in 2009. Other African exporters have 
experienced considerably less variation in government revenue during the crisis period.  
While temporary fiscal – as well as external – deficits do not create major vulnerabilities, 
lasting imbalances require a tightening of fiscal policy, which has implications for growth 
performance. As noted above, many African countries also use commodity stabilisation funds 
to offset the adverse long-term effects of volatility in commodity prices.  
                                                  
4    Trade shocks in this calculation comprise shocks to export demand and the terms of trade. The export 
demand shocks reflect changes in the volume of exports, while the terms-of-trade shocks reflect the gains or 





Trade shocks experienced by African countries 



































Economies are considered as diversified if no major export category makes up more than 40% (for manufactures, 
50%) of total exports. Any concentration exceeding 40% defines the export specialisation.  
1  Changes in the US dollar value of total merchandise trade (exports and imports), as a percentage of GDP.  
Source: United Nations (2011). 
 
Since the weight of food and energy in the consumption baskets of many African countries is 
very high, fluctuations in the prices of food and energy have a significant bearing on inflation 
outcomes. The commodity price shock resulted in a sharp increase in the CPI inflation from 
6¾% in 2007 to 11½% in 2008 (Appendix Table A5). Exchange rate depreciation has 
exacerbated domestic price pressures in many countries during the crisis.  
How should monetary policy respond to relative price changes? Theory suggests that 
monetary policy should not react to relative price changes judged to be temporary – in an 
economy largely free of distortions, relative prices should return to the configuration 
prevailing before the temporary disturbance. However, if the shift in relative prices is judged 
to be permanent, monetary policy should facilitate adjustment that will allow the economy to 
move to a new equilibrium.  
As it is extremely difficult to ascertain in practice if the change in relative prices is temporary 
or permanent, policymakers often consider the impact of relative price changes on inflation 
expectations as a guide in their policy decisions. As long as inflation expectations are well 
anchored and inflation remains in line with the medium-term target, central banks do not 
react to relative price changes. In practice, this means that one of the main challenges for 
monetary policy confronted with commodity price increases is to prevent second-round 
effects of higher commodity prices, ie their spillover to inflation expectations and wages. As 
discussed in Christensen (2011), the extent to which this is possible depends crucially on the 
availability of reliable indicators of inflation expectations and the effectiveness of the 




4.  Foreign exchange intervention  
Monetary policy in EMEs has paid increasing attention to the pursuit of exchange rate 
stability and, hence, foreign exchange market intervention in recent years. One rationale for 
this shift is the finding that floating exchange rate regimes often display higher real exchange 
rate volatility than fixed rate regimes (the so-called “Mussa puzzle”).
5 Another concerns the 
developments during the global financial crisis, but also features of the current conjuncture, 
including the exchange rate impact of volatile capital flows, low global interest rates and 
spillovers from changes in risk aversion in global financial markets. Central banks have been 
concerned about the impact of heightened exchange rate volatility on macroeconomic and 
financial stability, as well as on external competitiveness and resource allocation. As a result, 
many central banks are finding greater merit in stabilising exchange rates than in the past. 
Like in many other EMEs, exchange rate policies in Africa have tended to be asymmetric in 
that they generally “lean against the wind” by attempting to prevent currency appreciation but 
not currency depreciation (IMF (2008)). Thus, over 2001–08 nominal effective exchange 
rates in sub-Saharan Africa depreciated by 25% on average relative to their level in 2000, 
and in 2009–10 by a further 10% (Graph 8, left-hand panel). The weakening was entirely due 
to the floating currencies – before the crisis they depreciated by almost 40% on average 
relative to the 2000 level, and in 2009–10 by another 15%. By contrast, the sub-Saharan 
African currencies with fixed exchange rates strengthened by 6% in nominal effective terms 
before the crisis, and by another 2% after the crisis.  
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1  Trade-weighted indices; 2000 = 100. Simple average of monthly indices for 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
with floating and fixed exchange rate regimes.  
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2010. 
 
The pickup in inflation following the commodity price shock of 2008 has resulted in real 
appreciation of about 25% on average in countries with floating exchange rates, and 7% in 
countries with fixed exchange rates (Graph 8, centre panel). A key question is whether this 
appreciation reflects an improvement in the terms of trade. If this is the case, it could mean 
that equilibrium exchange rates have adjusted to more elevated levels.  
                                                  
5    See Filardo et al (2011) for a discussion of the policy dilemmas related to foreign exchange market 




Although high real exchange rate volatility can have significant adverse effects on trade and 
investment flows, monetary policy has not been particularly successful in influencing real 
exchange rate movements over the medium term. In fact, evidence suggests that fiscal 
policy may be more effective in addressing issues of external competitiveness in Africa 
(Elbadawi et al (2007)). There is also evidence that targeting the exchange rate could lead to 
higher volatility of interest rates and output, and much higher inflation outcomes (Calvo et al 
(1995)). In addition, the pursuit of exchange rate smoothing as a secondary objective could 
confuse the public about the primary objective of monetary policy, and hence affect the 
credibility of the central bank. 
In summary, monetary policy in African developing countries is confronted with some difficult 
trade-offs in the face of capital inflows. Theory suggests that raising interest rates is 
appropriate if the upward pressure on the currency occurs at a time when the output gap is 
positive and inflationary pressures are strong. However, monetary tightening could attract 
additional capital inflows and fuel the growth of domestic asset prices.  
Sterilised interventions could assist in addressing disruptive exchange rate movements in 
such circumstances, and help build up foreign exchange reserves to cushion the effects of a 
sudden reversal of capital inflows. However, there are considerable risks and costs 
associated with prolonged foreign exchange market intervention, including sterilisation costs, 
valuation losses and domestic credit expansion if the sterilisation is incomplete or ineffective.  
On the other hand, while unsterilised intervention could alleviate exchange rate appreciation 
pressures, the increase in domestic money supply resulting from the expansion of banking 
system balance sheets could lead to higher inflation outcomes. In this case, countercyclical 
fiscal policy could assist monetary policy in dampening domestic demand pressures. 
However, this raises political economy and coordination issues that are difficult to deal with 
even in advanced economies with well functioning institutions, and all the more so in poorer 
developing countries with weaker institutions.  
5. Conclusion 
Capital inflows and volatile commodity price movements pose significant policy challenges 
for developing countries. These challenges are of particular relevance to policymakers in 
Africa, where large capital inflows and rising commodity prices in recent years have strongly 
affected macroeconomic quantities (fixed investment, trade balances, domestic credit 
growth, government revenue, GDP growth) as well as prices (CPI inflation, terms of trade, 
exchange rates). How to respond to these developments is an important issue at the current 
juncture, given the uncertainty about the future course of commodity prices and global capital 
flows. While the impact of real exchange rate volatility on macroeconomic and financial 
stability is an important policy consideration in the African context, it remains unclear whether 
and how far central banks should incorporate exchange rate stability considerations into their 
monetary policy frameworks. 






Net private capital inflows 
Amounts outstanding, in billions of US dollars 
  2001 2007 2009 2010 
Total private capital inflows, net             4.9           43.8            57.9            79.1  
  Emerging markets             0.0           35.5            33.2            42.8  
  Frontier markets             1.3             0.3            17.9            15.6  
  Financially developing countries             3.7             7.9              6.8            20.7  
Foreign direct investment  23.3  60.2  51.6  52.3 
  Emerging markets           13.9           24.4            20.6            14.9  
  Frontier markets             3.4           12.4            11.6            11.3  
  Financially developing countries             6.0           23.5            19.4            26.1  
Portfolio investment  –8.9  9.7  –2.3  18.7 
  Emerging markets  –7.6  14.1  1.3  22.1 
  Frontier markets  –0.2  –0.2  –0.4  0.0 
  Financially developing countries  –1.1  –4.1  –3.3  –3.4 
Other investments  –9.5  –26.2  8.7  8.1 
  Emerging markets  –6.3  –2.9  11.3  5.8 
  Frontier markets  –1.9  –11.8  6.6  4.3 
  Financially developing economies  –1.2  –11.4  –9.3  –2.0 
Totals include 53 African countries for which the IMF’s World Economic Outlook data are available. For the 
country composition of the subgroups (emerging markets, frontier markets and financially developing countries), 
see Section 2 of this paper.  





Selected infrastructure-related financing agreements between 
Asian and African countries signed in 2010 
Country of origin  Beneficiary country  Value (USD billions) 
China   Ghana  13.4 
Korea Ghana  1.5 
China   Democratic Republic of Congo  6.0 
China   Cameroon  0.7 
China   Nigeria  0.9 





Net portfolio capital inflows 
Annual average for 2000–09, in million of US dollars 
South Africa  4,567.4  Mali  1.6 
Nigeria 707.0  Cape  Verde  0.9 
Uganda 45.4  Zambia  0.7 
Mauritius 13.6  Niger  0.7 
Namibia 9.9  Sierra  Leone  0.6 
Togo 8.0  Benin 0.4 
Botswana 7.2  Mozambique  0.1 
Swaziland 4.2  Burkina  Faso  –0.1 
Tanzania 2.9  Tunisia  –0.9 
Ivory Coast  2.8  Cameroon  –3.0 
Kenya 1.6  Senegal  –13.2 
   Egypt  –209.4 






Government revenue in sub-Saharan Africa
1 
 2004–08  2007  2008  2009 
Sub-Saharan Africa  26  26  28  23 
   Commodity exporters  32  31  34  24 
   Oil exporters  34  31  36  24 
   Other exporters  23  23  24  23 
1  Excluding grants, as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: IMF. 





Consumer price inflation 
  2000–06 2007  2008  2009  2010 
Algeria 2.3  3.6 4.9  5.7  4.3 
Angola 109.2  12.2 12.5  13.7  14.5 
Benin 3.2  1.3  8.0 2.2 2.1 
Botswana 8.5  7.1  12.6  8.1  7.0 
Burkina Faso  2.5  –0.2 10.7  2.6  0.4 
Burundi 9.6  8.3  24.4  10.7  6.4 
Cameroon 2.5  1.1  5.3  3.0  1.3 
Cape Verde  1.1  4.4  6.8  1.0  2.1 
Central African Republic 3.0  0.9  9.3  3.5  1.5 
Chad 3.8  –7.4  8.3  10.1  1.0 
Comoros 4.2  4.5  4.8  4.8  2.7 
DR Congo  140.6  16.7 18.0  46.2  23.5 
Djibouti 2.2  5.0  12.0 1.7 4.0 
Egypt 4.6  11.0  11.7  16.2  11.7 
Equatorial Guinea  6.1 2.8  4.3  7.2  7.5 
Eritrea 18.1  9.3 19.9  33.0  12.7 
Ethiopia 5.2  15.8 25.3  36.4  2.8 
Gabon 0.7  5.0  5.3 1.9 0.6 
Ghana 19.6  10.7  16.5 19.3 10.7 
Guinea 15.7  22.9  18.4  4.7  15.5 
Guinea-Bissau 2.4  4.6 10.4  –1.6  1.1 
Ivory Coast  2.6  1.9  6.3  1.0  1.4 
Kenya 7.9  4.3  16.2  9.3  3.9 
Lesotho 6.8  8.0 10.7  7.2  3.8 
Liberia 8.5  13.7  17.5  7.4  7.3 
Libya –2.6  6.2  10.4  2.8  2.4 
Madagascar 10.8  10.4 9.2  9.0  9.0 
Malawi 17.8  8.0  8.8  8.7  6.9 
Mali 1.9  1.5  9.1  2.2  1.2 
Mauritania 7.7  7.3 7.3  2.2  6.1 
Mauritius 5.5  8.6 9.7  2.5  2.9 
Morocco 1.7  2.0  3.9  1.0  1.0 
Mozambique 12.0  8.2  10.3  3.3  12.7 
Namibia 6.9  6.7  10.4  8.8  4.5 
Niger 2.3  0.1  10.5 1.1 0.9 
Nigeria 13.4  5.4 11.6  12.5  13.7 
Republic of Congo  2.4 2.6  6.0  4.3  5.0 
Rwanda 6.7  9.1  15.4 10.3  2.3 
São Tomé and Príncipe  13.2 18.5  26.1  17.0  14.4 
Senegal 1.5  5.9 5.8  –1.7  1.2 
Seychelles 2.6  5.3  37.0  31.9  –2.4 
Sierra Leone  5.9  11.7  14.8  9.2  17.8 
South Africa  5.1  7.1 11.5  7.1  4.3 
Sudan 7.6  8.0  14.3 11.3 13.0 
Swaziland 6.8  9.7  13.1  7.5  4.5 
Tanzania 4.7  6.3 8.4  11.8  10.5 
The Gambia  7.5  5.4  4.5  4.6  5.0 
Togo 2.5  0.9  8.7  1.9  3.2 
Tunisia 2.9  3.4  4.9  3.5  4.4 
Uganda 4.8  6.8  7.3 14.2  9.4 
Zambia 19.5  10.7  12.4  13.4  8.5 
Zimbabwe  6.5 3.0 
Average 11.0  6.7 11.6  8.9  6.1 
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